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OTC MARKETS · Banking
$58.98
0.00% · live
Updated
$60.8M market value
From Lifestore Financial Group Inc's FY2024 annual-report
It took in $22.4M last year, which makes it a small company. Of every dollar it sells, about 22 cents is left as profit.
The financial picture is led by profitability, with debt worth watching, while growth remain weak.
A conclusion from the filings, not a recommendation. Detailed figures and supporting evidence appear in their dedicated sections below.
Financial health
A mixed picture — some clear strengths and some weaknesses.
From Lifestore Financial Group Inc's FY2024 annual filing · share price scored separately
Largest year-over-year changes in FY2024
Free cash flow
$4.2M → $6.6M
Capital spending
$2.9M → $406.0K
Profit
$5.9M → $5.0M
Profit margin
25.3% → 22.4%
Measured against FY2023, from the annual-report
Improved: +56.8%
$4.2M to $6.6MCritical
Why it matters: Cash left after paying for the plant that produced it — the money genuinely available for dividends, buybacks or paying down debt. Harder to flatter than profit.
How the latest move compares (quote live), and what was published around it
LSFG was unchanged on the latest quote. The S&P 500 moved −0.47%. That is in line with the market.
No filing from LSFG and no news item about it appeared in the last 3 days.
These coincide with the move in time. None is presented as its cause: a price can move on news that names no company, on the wider market, or on trading that no document records.
Filter by minute, hour, day or week — or compare against peers
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Expectations
Not from the filings — what other people are betting on, and what the price already assumes.
The growth rate someone buying today is paying for, against what the company has delivered
At today's price, the market is paying for free cash flow to shrink by about 5% a year for the next 10 years. Over the last 2 years it grew by about 14% a year.
The essentials
Each answered from the filings, with the numbers behind it.
Yes. It keeps about 22 cents of every dollar of sales as profit, earning $5.0M last year.
No. Sales shrank 3.5% last year.
It is tight. For every $1 it owes, it owns $1.13 in assets.
Core operating and valuation reference metrics
Income
This company pays no dividend. It keeps its profits and reinvests them in the business instead, so any return would have to come from the share price.
Figures from the FY2024 annual filing
Last year it earned $5.0M and generated $7.0M of cash from operations.
Reported annual figures
As reported to the SEC, in USD. Hover or show sources to see where each figure came from.
| Income statement | FY2024annual-report | FY2023annual-report | FY2022annual-report | ChangeFY2024 vs FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RevenueWhat is this? | $22.4M | $23.2M | $21.1M | −3.5% |
| Selling, general and administrative | $712.2K | $792.7K | $538.7K | −10.2% |
| Interest expense | $8.3M | $3.9M | $997.9K | +112.5% |
| Income before tax | $6.0M | $7.1M | $6.0M | −14.3% |
| Net income | $5.0M | $5.9M | $4.9M | −14.6% |
| Net marginNet income ÷ revenueWhat is this? | 22.4% | 25.3% | 23.1% | −2.9 pts |
| Earnings per shareNet income ÷ shares outstanding at the period end — close to, but not the same as, the reported EPSWhat is this? | $4.87 | $5.70 | $4.74 | −14.6% |
† calculated from other reported figures, such as total liabilities as assets minus equity.
Insider activity, ownership stakes and what's coming — straight from EDGAR, before any article is written about it
Nothing recent
No insider trades, pending-sale notices or 5% stake filings from LSFG in the last few months. That is the ordinary case, not a gap.
Not investment advice, and not a signal to act on by itself — a filing says what happened, not why, and insiders trade for ordinary reasons having nothing to do with where they think the company is headed.
Write down why you are following Lifestore Financial Group Inc, what has to go right and what would change your mind, then see each new annual report measured against it. Sign in to start one.
Go deeper
Every figure above traces back to one of these filings.
Straight from SEC EDGAR — the original source for every figure above
No filings found
This company has no recent filings indexed on EDGAR.
Coverage from the last 30 days
Nothing in the last 30 days
No articles have been published about LSFG in the past month. Its filings are listed alongside, and they are the more reliable record anyway.
Primary sources and further research
Every company's figures are checked for internal consistency: the balance sheet adding up, figures sharing one currency, cash flow and share counts within plausible ranges, and how recent the latest annual report is. Nothing here changes a figure.
Financial figures are from LSFG's annual-report for fiscal year 2024 (period ending 2024-06-30), reported under the US GAAP taxonomy.
3 of 4 scored areas had enough reported figures to judge
The score averages profitability, growth, debt and accounting. Accounting had too few reported figures and is left out of the average rather than counted as a weakness, so a company is never marked down for a figure it did not publish. Cash generation is shown for context and already feeds profitability. Valuation is scored separately, because a share price says nothing about whether the business is sound. 6 of the 9 Piotroski checks could be evaluated. How the score works
Every check behind the three models, and what each one tests
4 of 6 checks passed
Nine yes-or-no tests of whether this year's finances improved on last year's. 3 could not be evaluated and are excluded from the total rather than counted as failures.
not reported — This company has not reported enough of the required figures to calculate this score.
This company has not reported enough of the required figures to calculate this score.
Distance from bankruptcy, from a model fitted on companies that did and did not go bust. It describes a balance sheet's shape today; it does not forecast a failure.
not reported — This company has not reported enough of the required figures to calculate this score.
This company has not reported enough of the required figures to calculate this score.
Screens eight accounting ratios for the pattern earnings manipulators tend to leave. A flag is a reason to read the filing closely, never evidence of wrongdoing.
Changed: -85.8%
$2.9M to $406.0KCritical
Why it matters: Neither good nor bad on its own. Heavy spending is a company building capacity or a company struggling to stand still, and the two look identical in this figure.
Deteriorated: -14.6%
$5.9M to $5.0MNotable
Why it matters: Profit swings far more than sales do, and one-off items — a legal settlement, a tax charge, an asset sale — move it without the underlying business changing.
Deteriorated: −2.9 pts
25.3% to 22.4%Notable
Why it matters: What survives to the very end of each sale. Worth reading beside revenue: growing sales on a shrinking margin means the company is buying its growth.
Deteriorated: -14.6%
$5.70 to $4.87Notable
Why it matters: Profit divided by the shares in issue at the period end, so it sits close to but not on the company's own reported figure. It can rise with no growth in profit when the company buys back stock — read it beside the share count.
2 other measures barely moved. Figures compare the two most recent annual filings. Moves are graded on fixed lines — 5%, 15% and 40% for amounts, and 1, 3 and 8 points for margins — as notable, significant or critical. Nothing here reads the management commentary, which is where a company explains its own numbers.
Discounted at 8%–10% a year, with growth settling to 2.5% after 10 years. Those rates are ordinary choices, not measurements: across that range the assumed growth works out between -7% and -3%. This describes what the price implies — it is not a forecast, and not a view on whether the price is right.
Measured on and published about a week later — this is a fortnightly snapshot, not a live position.
About 0.0% of this company's shares have been borrowed and sold by people expecting to buy them back cheaper. That is a bet the price falls. Those people can be wrong, and when a heavily shorted share rises they have to buy it back, which pushes it up further.
Collected by FINRA from broker-dealers twice a month. It counts positions, not intentions, and some of it is hedging rather than a directional bet against the company.
Nothing in this section is a figure this company reported about itself. These are expectations and positions — what the price implies, what analysts have published, what short sellers are betting, and what large funds held at the last count. WylthIQ reports them; it does not endorse them, does not forecast prices, and takes no view on whether any of them will turn out to be right.
The trailing P/E is 12.1x — investors pay $12.1 for each $1 of trailing profit.
This company has not reported enough of the required figures to calculate this score.
* Valuation inputs marked stale are based on an annual filing older than eighteen months. The market value is current, but the denominator is not.